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AIRLINE DEREGULATION DESERVES ANOTHER SHOT:
HOW FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS AND
SUBSIDIES ACTUALLY HURT THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
CHRISTOPHER MCBAY*
W HEN THINKING of the United States economy, many peo-
ple Is first thoughts are of capitalism and free markets.
Many Americans believe that such a system led the United States
to the prominent position that it currently enjoys in the world
economy. A prominent part of the United States economy, how-
ever, does not enjoy the benefits of such ideals. United States
airlines still operate under a veil of quasi-regulation that has
been largely responsible for the historically poor performance
of the industry as a whole.' These regulations and policies are
commonly thought and intended to aid the airline industry, but
their actual effects contribute to incredibly poor performance
industry wide.2
One particularly damaging regulation that is holding airlines
back is a legislative restriction on foreign investment in United
States air carriers. The United States government mandates that
foreign parties may not own more than 25 percent of any
United States air carrier,3 and also severely restricts the right of
control that any foreign investor has in a United States airline.4
This comment seeks to show that in the modern globalized
economy, not only is the restriction on foreign investment un-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2007; B.B.A., Baylor
University, 2004. The author would like to thank Mike McBay and Aleece
Eatherly McBay for their past and continued support.
I See Paul J. Gessing, Time to Re-deregulate the Airline Industry, NAT'L TAXPAYERS
UNION, 2005, http://www.ntu.org/main/press.php?PressID=739&org-name=
NTU.
2 James Bernstein, JetBlue Expects Quarterly Loss, NEWSDAY, January 17, 2006, at
A38.
3 14 C.F.R. § 47 .8(c) (2006).
4 Id.
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necessary, but it is also responsible for many of the difficulties
the entire airline industry faces.
This comment also focuses on the United States government's
policy of providing massive subsidies and bailouts to airlines
when they face financial trouble.5 This practice, while intended
to help the fragile airline industry, is actually part of a destruc-
tive cycle of government sponsored overcapacity. By keeping
too many airlines afloat through such subsidies, the government
promotes excess capacity, which in turn creates a competitive
passenger airline market where it is extremely difficult for any
airline to profit.6
Part I of this comment will explore the legislation that estab-
lishes the restrictions on foreign ownership in United States air-
lines. This part of the comment begins by reviewing the history
of the legislation, noting that the restriction is actually intended
to protect the airline industry, save jobs, answer national security
concerns, and promote safety.7 Each of these intentions is ex-
amined individually, and investigation reveals that not only are
such concerns largely groundless, but in many instances the situ-
ation is actually worsened by denying struggling United States
air carriers access to this source of capital. Examples are given
of how this is hurting United States airlines in very real ways.
Next, a section of this comment is devoted to exploring the
idea that these restrictions on foreign investment are actually a
new form of regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.8
This part of the comment puts the regulation through the regu-
latory taking balancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York9 to analyze whether these restrictions constitute
a taking. While an interesting thought, this comment comes to
the ultimate conclusion that the balancing test does not show
the regulations to be a taking and lobbying efforts must be un-
dertaken to encourage Congress to change this detrimental
legislation.
5 Andrew Stephen, America - Andrew Stephen Fears the Worst for US Airlines, NEW
STATESMAN, May 23, 2005, http://www.newstatesman.com/life/200505230014.
6 James Bernstein, JetBlue Expects Quarterly Loss, NEWSDAY, January 18, 2006,
http://www.newsday.com/business/printedition/ny-bzside4591682janl 8,0,5866
356,print.story?coll=ny-business-print.
7 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, infra note 10.
8 Ryan S. Holtan-Murphy, Comment, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: Federal Aviation
Regulations as Regulatory Takings, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 699, 702 (2003).
9 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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Part II of this comment will deal with government induced
overcapacity in the United States air carrier market. This section
will explore how government subsidies to struggling airlines in-
tended as assistance are actually part of a destructive cycle that
sponsors excess capacity in the United States air passenger mar-
ket. As part of this analysis, bankruptcy processes for airlines
will be critiqued for allowing airlines to consistently enter into
bankruptcy, only to emerge again to contribute to more over-
capacity issues for the entire industry. Along with recom-
mending that all airline subsidies cease and that failing airlines
should be allowed to fail, consolidation of the airline market
through mergers and the United States government's changing
approach to this practice, is also discussed.
I. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Foreign investment in United States airlines is restricted by
protectionist legislation to a very high degree. This stands in
stark contrast to other United States markets that welcome capi-
tal investments regardless of geography, helping to make the
United States economy a major destination for foreign funds.
Although this comment argues that the reasoning behind such
protectionist policy is flawed, it is helpful to look at the justifica-
tions and history behind its implementation.
A. How FoREIGN INVESTMENT BECAME RESTRICTED IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
1. The Air Commerce Act
The first piece of legislation to deal with citizenship require-
ments for United States airlines was the Ar Commerce Act of
1926 ("ACA"). 10 The Act specified that in order for an aircraft
to be registered in the United States, and thus operational in
the United States, the owners of the aircraft must be United
States citizens.1" In order to be considered a citizen under the
ACA, United States citizens had to own at least 51 percent of the
10 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES RELATING TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND CONTROL OF U.S. AIRLINES 1 (2003). The General Accounting Office issued
this report to Senator Trent Lott in October of 2003 after the Bush Administra-
tion proposed legislation that would raise the total foreign ownership allowed in
the stock of a United States airline to 49 percent. Id. at 1.
11 Id.
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aircraft. 12 The ACA also mandated that the president and two-
thirds of the board of directors of every United States based air-
line be U.S. citizens. 13 The principal purpose behind the ACA
was primarily national security." At the time, Congress was con-
cerned that the United States Air Force would need support
from the commercial aviation industry and that a foreign power,
namely Germany, could use their investments to gain control of
United States airlines and use them against the United States.15
2. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
Foreign investment in United States airlines was further re-
stricted when Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
("CAA"). This act required that U.S. citizens own or control at
least 75 percent of the voting rights in United States airlines.' 6
In order to justify such a restrictive measure, Congress cited na-
tional defense and economic interests. 17 One such economic
interest that Congress wished to protect was ongoing subsidies
to the airline industry through airmail contracts from the gov-
ernment.'" Congress felt that restricting foreign investment in
United States airlines would keep these government subsidies
from benefiting the unintended audience of foreign investors
and foreign corporations.1 9
The CAA also created the Civil Aeronautics Authority.2 0 The
agency's name was later changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board
12 Id.
13 Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 704.
14 See Seth M. Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and
Cabotage Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 Am. U.L. REv. 277, 305
(1993).
15 Id. at 305-06.
16 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2.
17 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 705-06 (noting that "the first and per-
haps most important of these policy concerns was the protection of United States
economic interests"). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2
n.2. Foreign Investment and Control Limits on United States Airlines (1992).
"The United States has restricted ownership and control of U.S. airlines for four
primary reasons: (1) protection of the then-fledgling U.S. airline industry, (2)
regulation of international air service through bilateral agreements, (3) concern
about allowing foreign aircraft access to U.S. airspace, and (4) military reliance
on civilian airlines to supplement airlift capacity." Id. at 2 n.2.
18 See Holton-Murphy, supra note 8, at 705.
19 See id.
20 Ved P. Nanda, Comment, Substantial Ownership and Control of International
Airlines in the United States, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 357, 365 (2002).
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("CAB"), which is responsible for regulating market entry and
exit, anti-competitive behavior, and airfare pricing.2'
3. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
The next significant piece of legislation that Congress passed
regarding foreign investment in United Airlines was the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.22 The Federal Aviation Act kept intact the
restrictions on foreign investment began under the ACA and
CAA by requiring that all United States carriers be a "citizen of
the United States. ' 23 In order for a carrier to be a "citizen,"
United States citizens must own 75 percent of the voting interest
in the carrier.24 Additionally, The Department of Transporta-
tion ("DOT") has interpreted the law to require that United
States citizens actually control U.S. air carriers.
4. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The CAB continued to regulate the aviation industry until
1976,26 at which point the CAB suggested to Congress that the
aviation industry be deregulated in order to combat poor profit-
ability in United States airlines. Congress responded by passing
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ("Deregulation Act").27
This act, while a step towards liberalization, was limited in scope.
The Deregulation Act encouraged competition by subjecting
21 Id.
22 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 130-1557 (West 1988 & Supp. I 1989, Supp. 111990 &
Supp. III 1991)).
23 See id. § 1301(16). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 mandates that U.S. air
carriers must be U.S. citizens. According to the statute a "citizen of the United
States" means:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or of one of
its possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each member is such
an individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or organ-
ized under the laws of the United States or of any state, territory, or
possession of the United States, of which the president and two-
thirds or more of the board of directors and other managing of-
ficers thereof are such individuals and in which at least 75 per cen-
turn of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who
are citizens of the United States or of one of its possessions.
Id. § 101(6).
24 49 U.S.C.A. § 40102 (West 2006).
25 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2.
26 See Angela Edwards, Comment, Foreign Investment in the U.S. Airline Industry:
Friend or Foe?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 595, 604 (1995).
27 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (West 1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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pricing, route designations, and market entry to market con-
trols, 28 but foreign investment restrictions found in the earlier
legislation remained completely unchanged.29
5. The Current State of Foreign Investment Restrictions in United
States Airlines
In response to heavy losses suffered by the United States avia-
tion industry in 1990 and 1991, the DOT recommended easing
restrictions on foreign investment in United States airlines by
allowing foreign investors to own up to 49 percent of the voting
rights in a U.S. airline. 0 The DOT reported that this proposal
would help the financial health of the airline industry due to the
access to additional financial capital, make the airline industry
more efficient, and help conform United States ownership limi-
tations with European laws. 3 1 However, Congress did not act on
this recommendation and rejected the DOT's proposals. 2
Most recently, in 2003, the Bush Administration revisited the
idea of loosening the restrictions on foreign investment and
proposed allowing 49 percent of voting stock to be owned by
foreign entities, an increase from the current maximum of 25
percent.33  Unfortunately, this proposal was rejected by
Congress. 4
B. EXAMPLES OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
RESTRICTION PROBLEM
Beginning in the 1980s, foreign airlines attempted to invest in
the United States airline industry.3 5 Due to investment restric-
tions, these foreign investors were either discouraged from in-
vesting, or invested and then eventually disinvested after their
investment efforts were frustrated by the regulations. 6 Accord-
ing to the United States General Accounting Office, the non-
partisan audit, evaluation, and investigative agency of the
United States Congress, a major reason for this frustration and
28 See Angela Edwards, supra note 26, at 605.
29 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2.
30 Id. at 3.
3 Id.
32 Id.
3 Id. at 1.
34 Gessing, supra note 1.




eventual disinvestment was United States policies regarding air-
line control. 7
1. Wings Acquisition, Inc.
An illustrative example of how restrictions on foreign invest-
ment actually hinder the airline industry instead of helping it is
the case of Wings Acquisition, Inc. In 1989, NWA, Inc. (the par-
ent company of Northwest Airlines) announced that it was go-
ing to be acquired by Wings Acquisition, Inc. ("Wings").38 NWA
believed that this takeover would provide a helpful infusion of
capital and create market opportunities in Europe. 9 A Dutch
corporation, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines ("KLM"), owned
roughly 57 percent of the equity in Wings, but ohly 5 percent of
the voting interest.40
In order to satisfy the U.S. foreign investment restrictions,
Wings negotiated with the DOT and took a number of steps to
comply. 4' First, Wings placed the amount of KLM's equity
above 25 percent in Wings in a voting trust.42 Next, KLM's right
to appoint a financial advisory committee was terminated.43 Fi-
nally, KLM agreed to disqualify its board member from partici-
pating in all decisions on competitive and international aviation
matters.44
In 1991, NWA petitioned for reconsideration to allow in-
creased equity investment in Wings by KLM.45 At this time the
DOT made a distinction between voting equity and nonvoting
equity that had not been made before.46 In its decision, the
DOT allowed KLM to acquire up to 49 percent total equity in
Wings, but limited KLM's voting equity to 25 percent.47 This
decision, which allowed KLM to increase its ownership stake in
Wings without increasing its voting equity power, represented a
step toward liberalization for the DOT.48  However, in 1997
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id. at 5.
39 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 708 (citing Acquisition of Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., DOT Order No. 91-1-41, at 2.)
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KLM disinvested from NWA in order to take advantage of the
international market without direct financial investment.49
2. British Airways' Attempted Acquisition of US Airways
In 1992, British Airways desired to invest $750 million in US
Airways (later changing its name to US Air).5o In exchange for
the capital infusion, British Airways would have received 44 per-
cent of US Airways' total equity, 21 percent of the voting equity,
representation on US Airways' board of directors, and substan-
tial control over US Airways' managerial and financial deci-
sions.51 The DOT started a review of the transaction,52 but the
Bush Administration ultimately denied this proposal due to for-
eign investment issues and conflicts of air agreements between
the British Government and the United States53 Eventually,
British Airways eliminated the governance condition in their
original plan and only invested $300 million.54
After the investment, US Air ran into severe financial
trouble,55 and British Airways withdrew from its relationship
with US Air in 1997.56 US Air's largest problem was its market
position.57 US Air was too large to be a discount airline, but too
small to be a major national airline.5 The airline was also hin-
dered by a fleet of old, expensive aircraft.59 Finally, in 2002, US
Air filed for bankruptcy.60 As part of the bankruptcy workout,
US Air received $500 million in debtor financing from two in-
vestment banks, and a $200 million equity investment from an
investment group.61
The question must be asked whether the bankruptcy could
have been avoided if US Air had been able to receive more eq-
uity financing from foreign investors prior to bankruptcy. While
impossible to answer for certain, the original planned contribu-




53 Standing Firm for Open Skies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at A16.
54 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 6.
55 US Air Files for Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY, Aug. 12, 2002, http://money.cnn.
com/2002/08/1 1/news/companies/usair/.
56 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 6.







tion of $750 million from British Airways and the option to ob-
tain even more financing from foreign sources above the
government mandated 25 percent maximum would have cer-
tainly helped.62 With access to much needed foreign capital, US
Air might have become a national player in the airline market
and upgraded its fleet of aircraft.63 Instead, at least partly be-
cause of the restrictions on foreign investment in United States
airlines, US Air declared bankruptcy and received funding from
domestic sources.64 In the case of US Air, restrictions on foreign
investment actually hurt the airline rather than protect it as the
legislation intended.
Most issues of control restrictions deter foreign investors from
even reaching the stage described in the Wings and US Airways
situations.65 As a result, foreign investment in United States air-
lines is minimal.66 The General Accounting Office reported
that "as of May 2003 no major stockholders - U.S. or foreign -
owned more than 20 percent of any major U.S. network carrier."
C. ISSUES AND CONCERNS REGARDING LIFTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
As discussed earlier, the primary purposes behind the original
legislation placing restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. air
carriers were of national defense 67 and fear of foreign entities
profiting from government subsidies intended for domestic air-
lines.68 When considering whether such restrictions on United
States airline investment are prudent, it is necessary to analyze
the restrictions in terms of their original purpose and any issues
regarding the legislation that may have occurred over time.
1. Domestic Competition
Currently, United States airlines have more capacity than de-
mand.6 9 This situation has led to substantial financial difficulty
for the airline industry as a whole.7" In fact, the U.S. commer-
cial airline industry is faced with a number of problems, includ-
62 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 5-6.
63 See US Air Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 55.
64 See id.
65 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 4.
66 Id.
67 See Warner, supra note 14.
68 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8.
69 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, supra note 10, at 7.
70 [d.
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ing a weak economy, high fuel prices, and uncertainty in the
Middle East.7" Reacting to these conditions, many airlines laid
off employees, delayed new aircraft purchases, and imple-
mented cost cutting programs.72 For example, United Airlines
and American Airlines both experienced massive layoffs, and
Continental Airlines postponed the planned purchase of new
Boeing aircraft until their situation improved.73
Despite these actions and reductions in service, many airlines
are still in need of additional capital.7 ' Airlines seek this addi-
tional capital to upgrade their aircraft fleets and provide day-to-
day operating funds.75 In fact, most airlines want greater access
to foreign investors, some even going so far as to call for com-
plete removal of restrictions on investment.7 6 Access to this cap-
ital may be necessary to keep airlines running and out of
bankruptcy. 77 In fact, in September of 2005, both Delta and
Northwest Airlines filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 78 A major
reason for both the bankruptcies was high fuel prices and heavy
competition.79
Northwest and Delta are not the only airlines in financial
trouble. Most large airlines are having difficulties.8 0 The DOT
has suggested that allowing U.S. airlines increased access to in-
ternational capital markets could help alleviate the airlines'
problems in these times of distressed markets.8 Perhaps the
Northwest and Delta bankruptcies could have been avoided if
they were able to receive sufficient funding from international
sources to pay for their day-to-day operations and survive the
increased fuel costs.8 2 On the whole, it seems that United States
airlines struggling to compete domestically would greatly benefit
from increased access to foreign investment.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 7-8.
73 Id. at 8.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 4.
77 See id. at 7.




80 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7.
81 Id. at 8.




Another concern voiced by many proponents of restriction on
foreign investment is that foreign investors may pose a national
security risk.83 However, while security risks are a valid concern,
not only are such concerns largely unjustified, but there are also
ways to limit and contain such risk. Overall, once appropriate
measures have been taken to alleviate the security risks, the ad-
vantages of allowing greater foreign investment in United States
airlines far outweighs the possible detriments.
The most frequently voiced concern regarding allowing
greater foreign investment and its effect on national security is
with the viability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet ("CRAF") pro-
gram.8 4 The CRAF is a Department of Defense ("DOD") pro-
gram that provides the United States military with extra airlift
capacity in emergency situations.85 Under CRAF, the DOD con-
tracts with United States airlines for the use of their aircraft and
crew during times of emergency."6 Under the contract, the air-
lines are not compensated unless their services are actually
used. 7 In return for their pledge of availability, participating
airlines are eligible to bid for DOD's routine airlift business.8 8
In the event that an airline's aircraft and crew are activated, they
are paid at predetermined rates based on the airline's cost plus
a specified return on investment.8 9 According to the United
States Air Force, there are currently forty air carriers and 1,126
aircraft enrolled in the program.90
Concerns over the continued effectiveness of the CRAF pro-
gram can be allayed by looking at the current state of the pro-
gram and by taking appropriate steps to ensure its continued
effectiveness. First, according to the General Accounting Office,
there are already questions as to the viability of the CRAF pro-
gram's incentives to participate, and it is unclear whether a
change in foreign investment restrictions in United States air-
lines would affect the CRAF program at all.91 Another factor
83 See Edwards, supra note 26, at 639-42.
84 See id.
85 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFCE, supra note 10, at 7.




90 Air Force Link, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Factsheet, http://www.af.mil/fact
sheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=173 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
9' U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7-8.
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worth examining is the potential availability of aircraft under
CRAF. For the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the DOD activated
forty-seven passenger planes from twenty-two different airlines.
9 2
Comparing the forty-seven aircraft activated for a major opera-
tion such as the invasion of Iraq with the over 1100 aircraft avail-
able, it is apparent that the CRAF program has a high degree of
excess capacity.93 While still a valuable tool for the United
States military, even in a worst case scenario a reduction in par-
ticipation in the CRAF program simply does not pose a substan-
tial risk due to the advanced development of the United States
Air Force.94
Regardless of the actual effect on the CRAF program, if for-
eign investment restrictions were abolished, there are steps that
can be taken to ensure continued participation in the program.
First, the United States government should review any potential
foreign investor looking to make a substantial investment in a
United States air carrier. This type of review is already done by
the government in other industries such as the telecommunica-
tions industry.95 Any government or investor deemed hostile
could be denied the opportunity to invest. If such a review sys-
tem is still not sufficient to safeguard the security risk, agree-
ment to future CRAF participation could be linked with
government approval of the investment.
Threats to national security, while a very legitimate concern,
are simply not a realistic reason to block United States airlines
increased access to foreign capital. Not only would the changes
most likely have no impact on security issues such as CRAF, but
any issues could easily be dealt with by a review system already in
place in other industries.
3. Impact on Employment
Another issue that must be addressed when considering eas-
ing foreign investment restrictions is the impact it would have
on employment in the United States. Some parties worry that
allowing increased foreign investment would put jobs at risk.96
92 Raymond W. Copson & Paul Gallis, Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for
Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Mar. 4, 2003, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/18698.pdf.
93 Cf Air Force Link, supra note 90.
94 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 725.
95 Id. at 726.
96 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7-8; see Angela Edwards,
supra note 26, at 636-39.
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Proponents of this theory suggest that the jobs of pilots and
crews on international flights could be put at risk, or that other
airline related jobs may be transferred overseas if increased for-
eign investment is allowed. 7 Also of concern are labor rights.
Some have suggested that allowing foreign parties to invest in
United States airlines would "lead to a deteriorating working en-
vironment for airline professionals."9 8 However, this comment
will argue that airline industry employees' job security will in
fact be increased and labor rights will not be negatively affected
if foreign investment restrictions are removed.
As shown by the Northwest and Delta bankruptcies, protec-
tionist policies regarding foreign investment actually jeopardize
jobs rather than protecting them.99 Denied access to sufficient
capital, many airlines implement cost cutting efforts that in-
clude the termination of large numbers of employees. 0 0 Al-
lowing United States airlines greater access to foreign
investment would help stabilize financially weak airlines and
help protect employees' jobs and retirement plans.1"1
In contrast to the claims of labor unions 0 2 and other protec-
tionists' claims, 10 3 workers' rights will not be negatively affected
by easing restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. airlines. 104
In fact, there is no evidence that allowing greater foreign invest-
ment in United States airlines would affect labor at all.'0 5 Ac-
cording to the DOT, current collective bargaining agreements
and other regulations governing United States airlines and their
employees would prevent investors from changing the labor
rights of airline employees. 106 Thus, not only will easing restric-
97 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7-8.
98 Angela Edwards, supra note 26, at 638.
99 See Isidore, supra note 78.
100 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 8.
101 Gessing, supra note 1.
102 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 4.
103 Edwards, supra note 26, at 638.
104 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 8.
105 Id.
lo6 Id. The United States General Accounting Office reported that
DOT indicated that there is no evidence to suggest that increased
foreign investment in U.S. airlines would have any effect on labor.
DOT commented that, due to existing collective bargaining agree-
ments and other regulatory requirements governing U.S. airlines
and their employees, the administration's proposal would not af-
fect the rights of labor or the obligation of airlines with respect to
labor.
2007] 185
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tions on foreign investment in United States airlines actually
help protect airline employees' jobs, but no employee protec-
tions will be lost in the process. 107
4. International Competition
Besides the infusion of much needed capital into weak bal-
ance sheets,108 allowing greater access to foreign investment for
United States airlines could be utilized as a tool to persuade
other nations to liberalize their aviation markets.10 9 The United
States government could use the potential ability for a particular
nation to invest in the United States airline industry as a bar-
gaining chip to encourage that particular nation to allow United
States airlines increased access to their markets or to discourage
that nation from subsidizing its own airlines.110 However, in or-
der to understand the type of concessions the United States
might receive from other nations in exchange for investment
rights in U.S. airlines, a quick historical overview of bilateral
agreements is necessary.
The primary means of negotiating terms of international com-
mercial air service between nations is through bilateral agree-
ments."' Such agreements can concern, among other things,
air traffic rights, capacity, and frequency of international
flights. 1 2 In the United States, the President can enter into
such agreements without submitting them to the Senate for
ratification. 13
The first bilateral agreement entered into by the United
States was with the United Kingdom in 1946."' This agreement
is commonly known as Bermuda I."' Bermuda I appointed an
international body, the International Air Transport Association,
to set international tariffs and allowed each country to deter-
mine its own passenger capacity and frequency of service. 1 6
Bermuda I became a model agreement that the United States
107 See id.; Gessing, supra note 1.
108 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10.
109 Id. at 7.
110 See id.
II See Edwards, supra note 26, at 600.
112 Nanda, supra note 20, at 372-73.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Edwards, supra note 26, at 601.
116 Nanda, supra note 20, at 373.
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used to engage in bilateral agreements with roughly seventy-five
other countries.] 17
The United Kingdom withdrew from Bermuda I in 1976 due
to concerns that the U.S. was allowing too many air carriers on
routes to London.118 In response, the U.S. and the United King-
dom negotiated a new bilateral agreement called Bermuda II." 9
Bermuda II limited the number of air carriers that either coun-
try could authorize to operate between the countries and gave
each country control over passenger capacity. 20
Eventually, bilateral agreements began to fall out of favor in
the United States2  Facing a distressed airline market, 22 the
Clinton Administration began seeking to establish more liberal
aviation agreements with other countries. 123 This initiative,
known as the "Open Skies" program, 124 aimed to liberalize many
aspects of international aviation, including open entry on all
routes between countries and unrestricted capacity and fre-
quency of flights. 25 One of the main advantages of an Open
117 Edwards, supra note 26, at 601.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Nanda, supra note 20, at 373.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Edwards, supra note 26, at 602.
124 Nanda, supra note 20, at 374.
125 Id. at 374-375, (citing U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), In the
Matter of Defining "Open Skies," Order 92-8-13, Aug. 5, 1992, DOT Av. LEXIS
568, at *3.) The DOT defined "Open Skies" as an agreement that included the
following elements: (1) Open entry on all routes; (2) Unrestricted capacity and
frequency on all routes; (3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is, the right
to operate service between any point in the United States and any point in the
European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate and beyond
points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or the right to
carry Fifth Freedom traffic; (4) Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth
Freedom markets and (a) in intra-EC markets: price matching rights in third-
country markets, (b) in non intra-EC markets: price leadership in third-country
markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in those mar-
kets have it; (5) Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter regula-
tions of the two governments would apply, regardless of the origin of the flight);
(6) Liberal cargo regime (criteria as comprehensive as those defined for the
combination carriers); (7) Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers
would be able to convert earnings and remit in hard currency promptly and with-
out restriction; (8) Open code-sharing opportunities; (9) Self-handling provi-
sions (right of a carrier to perform/control its airport functions going to support
its operations); (1) Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities, user
charges, fair competition and intermodal rights; and (11) Explicit commitment
.for nondiscriminatory operation of and access for computer reservation systems.
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Skies agreement is that airlines of both countries involved are
able to fly from any point in one country to any point in the
other.126 Due to this advantage, greater opportunity for strate-
gic networking between international airlines is possible. 27
The first Open Skies Agreement was signed in 1992 between
the United States and the Netherlands. 128 Since that time, the
United States has entered into seventy-four Open Skies agree-
ments with various countries. 129 However, more restrictive avia-
tion agreements based on the older Bermuda bilateral
agreements still exist, limiting the efficiency of international
aviation.' 3
It is in the precise situation of a country that still has a restric-
tive bilateral agreement with the United States that easing re-
strictions on foreign investment in U.S. airlines could help the
U.S. airline industry win greater access to foreign markets. Be-
cause foreign countries want their investors to be able to invest
in the U.S. airline market, they may be willing to enter into an
Open Skies-type agreement in order to acquire this investment
access to the U.S. airline industry.131 In this situation, not only
would U.S. air carriers benefit from the increased access to capi-
tal that foreign investors could provide, but they would also reap
the benefits that come with Open Skies agreements. Under
these agreements, U.S. airlines would have the opportunity to
bring their expertise to compete in foreign markets that were
previously barred to them, with the added bonus of capital con-
tributions from foreign sources with which to do so. 3 2 Another
new opportunity to be taken advantage of for U.S. air carriers
would be international strategic alliances made possible by the
combination of reduced foreign investment restrictions and
Open Skies agreements. 33 Overall, using foreign investment as
a bargaining tool with other countries could allow U.S. air carri-
ers to apply their superior productivity to presently untapped
markets, while using foreign investors' funds to finance the ef-
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), In the Matter of Defining "Open
Skies," Order 92-8-13, Aug. 5, 1992, 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 568, at *3.
126 OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.
gov/e/eb/tra/c661.htm.
127 Id.
128 Nanda, supra note 20, at 375.
129 Open Skies Agreements, supra note 126.
130 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 8.
13, See id.
132 See Open Skies Agreements, supra note 126.
133 See id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10.
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fort. 134 Such a win-win situation for the U.S. airline industry can
hardly be overlooked.
5. Effect on Safety
A final concern when considering whether easing restrictions
on foreign investment in U.S. air carriers should be imple-
mented is safety. In reality, the effect on the safety of the U.S.
airline industry will be negligible.
One such potential safety issue is that removing or loosening
restrictions on foreign investment will cause foreign aircraft to
be added to the U.S. registry.13 The concern with adding air-
craft to the U.S. registry is that that the additional oversight re-
sponsibilities caused by the additional aircraft may become too
much for the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to han-
dle. l"6 However, this concern is baseless. The U.S. General Ac-
counting Office reports that there is no reason why foreign
aircraft would be transferred to the U.S. registry, even if foreign
investment restrictions in U.S. airlines were removed."3 7 Fur-
ther, even if aircraft were added to the U.S. registry, the FAA
would be able to handle the increased workload.133 Thus, be-
cause no noticeable effect will take place regarding airline
safety, it is definitely not a concern that should hold back sup-
port for reducing foreign investment restrictions in U.S. air
carriers.3 9
D. FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. AIR CARRIERS
AS REGULATORY TAKINGS
As discussed above, there are abundant legitimate policy rea-
sons why restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. air carriers
should be lifted, or at the very least reduced. However, there
may even be a successful legal argument that restrictions on for-
eign investment are an invalid regulatory taking. At least one
commentator has suggested that such a restriction "represents a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of the
134 See Gessing, supra note 1, at 5.
135 U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 7.
136 Id. at 9.
137 Id. The United States General Accounting Office noted, "In addition to
any legal obstacles to transferring foreign aircraft to U.S. registry, it is not clear
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Constitution."'40 This theory may be a new avenue that U.S. air
carriers suffering from a lack of foreign investment may use to
rid the industry of the counter-productive restrictions.
The Fifth Amendment protects private property from being
taken by the government except for public use, and then the
government must provide 'Just compensation" to the owner of
the property.' The Supreme Court has interpreted the Tak-
ings Clause to apply to situations where governmental regula-
tions so severely hinder the use of private property that the
regulations become a "regulatory taking."1 4 2 A brief history of
this Regulatory Takings Doctrine is necessary to examine how it
can be applied to foreign investment restrictions in U.S. airlines.
1. Penn Central as the Benchmark for Regulatory Takings
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the own-
ers of Grand Central Station were prevented from constructing
a fifty-story office building over the station by a landmark preser-
vation ordinance.' 43 The ordinance was aimed at protecting
landmarks in New York for historical reasons, to encourage tour-
ism, and for the general welfare of the city.'44 The owners of
Grand Central Station contended that the ordinance consti-
tuted a "taking" because the value of the station was "signifi-
cantly diminished" due to the ordinance and their property was
singled out for preservation. 145
The Court did not agree with the owners' contention that the
landmark law constituted a regulatory taking.'46 The majority
determined that the preservation ordinance was not a regula-
140 Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 727.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
142 See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
143 Id. at 107.
144 Id. at 109.
145 Id. at 131.
146 Id. at 138.
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
tory taking because the law was substantially related to a legiti-
mate government interest, and because the regulation still
allowed for some productive economic uses of the property. 147
The effect of Penn Central was to create an ad-hoc subjective
balancing test for regulatory takings, evaluating 1) the balance
of economic impact, 2) the level of interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations, and 3) the character of the govern-
mental action. 14 This test is employed whenever a government
regulation diminishes the value of a citizen's property. ' 49 Essen-
tially, a court will generally not deem legislation a regulatory tak-
ing if the legislation regulates a legitimate government interest
and has a sufficient relationship to that interest.150 Additionally,
the Penn Central test suggests that a court will further scrutinize
the legislation if the legislation affects the economic viability of
the property in a severe manner.1"1 While court-employed tak-
ings analysis is much more complex, this brief summary is suffi-
cient for our purpose of determining whether foreign
investment restrictions constitute a regulatory taking.
2. Applying the Penn Central Test to Foreign Investment
Restrictions in U.S. Air Carriers
Despite the ill-advised nature of restrictions on foreign invest-
ment in U.S. airlines, such restrictions are unlikely to be found
as regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, for the legis-
lation appears to pass muster under the Penn Central test. In
order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to analyze each
factor of the test in light of the current legislative situation re-
garding airline investment.
a. Economic Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions in
U.S. Airlines
The first part of the Penn Central balancing test requires a
measurement of the economic impact of the investment restric-
tions. This part of the test is most likely factored in favor of
determining that the restriction is a regulatory taking due to the
magnitude of the adverse impact on the airline industry. As dis-
147 Id. at 137-138.
148 Id. at 124.
149 ChrisJ. Williams, Comment, Do Smart Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings
Challenges? A Survey of Smart Growth and Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United
States, 55 ALA. L. REv. 895, 905 (2004).
150 Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 712-13.
151 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v, City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36.
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cussed above in the Wings and US Air examples, the lack of ac-
cess to capital that results from the restrictions can have a huge
impact on the airline industry. 152 Such impacts can include loss
of jobs," 3 delay of aircraft purchasing, 154 and even bank-
ruptcy."' Because of these negative consequences, one might
think that the economic impact factor has been satisfied.1 56
However, the economic impact factor still favors the investment
restrictions.
One hurdle this argument faces is that the foreign investment
restriction is broad, covering the entire U.S. airline industry in-
stead of singling out a single party to bear the cost. This aspect
makes the foreign investment restriction even more likely to be
valid because in Penn Central, where the harm was more local-
ized on the owners of Grand Central Station, it was still not con-
sidered a regulatory taking under the test.157  Another
important aspect to consider under the economic balancing test
is that despite the restrictions in question, the airline industry
continues to have significant business. Notwithstanding the lost
opportunities and efficiencies that foreign investment restric-
tions provide, the U.S. airline industry is a huge market that
conducts business on a global scale. Based on the Penn Central
decision, in which the Supreme Court noted that the economic
impact was not as great as the owners claimed due to the signifi-
cant business still operating in the terminal, a court here would
likely take account of the size and scope of the continued airline
operations despite a lack of foreign funds.1 58 Thus, this balanc-
ing factor points against the restrictions being a regulatory
taking.
b. Investment Restrictions Interference With Investment-
Backed Expectations
The next factor to be considered is whether the foreign in-
vestment restrictions interfere with "distinct investment-backed
152 See US Air Files for Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/
2002/08/11/news/companies/usair/; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
10, at 5.
153 See Isidore, supra note 78.
154 US Air Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 152.
155 Id.
156 Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 717.
157 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
158 See id. at 137-38.
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expectations."' 9 This part of the Penn Central test is the hardest
for the airline industry to overcome should they wish to chal-
lenge foreign investment restrictions as a regulatory taking. The
restriction on foreign investment has been in place since
1926.160 Airlines have been operating in the United States
under such a restriction for so long it almost seems absurd to
claim that the regulation is interfering with an airline's invest-
ment-backed expectation.161 Although this comment argues
that the restrictions are actually counter-productive, the regula-
tion was originally implemented to safeguard the U.S. airline in-
dustry and protect national security. 162 Given these assumptions
and the longevity of the legislation, it would be very difficult for
anyone to argue that their investment was based on the expecta-
tion that U.S. airlines would be allowed to accept increased
levels of capital from foreign investors.
63
c. Character of Government Action
The final point of analysis in the Penn Central balancing test is
the character of government action. 164 This factor is also a loser
for parties challenging restrictions on foreign investment in U.S.
airlines as regulatory takings. In Penn Central the majority wrote,
"A taking may be more readily found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by govern-
ment, than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good.' 1 6 5 Congress took action to pass the restric-
tions at issue with the purpose of protecting national security,
159 Id. at 124.
160 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10.
161 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136, 138.
162 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8, at 705-06 (noting that "[t]he first and
perhaps most important of these policy concerns was the protection of U.S. eco-
nomic interests.") See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2 n.2
(citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF CHANG-
ING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL LIMITS ON US AIRLINES (1992)).
The United States has restricted ownership and control of United
States airlines for four primary reasons: (1) protection of the then-
fledgling United States airline industry, (2) regulation of interna-
tional air service through bilateral agreements, (3) concern about
allowing foreign aircraft access to U.S. airspace, and (4) military
reliance on civilian airlines to supplement airlift capacity.
Id.
163 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
164 Id. at 124.
165 [(.
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securing jobs in the U.S. airline industry, and maintaining a
strong international presence in relation to other nations.'66
Obviously, these are legitimate governmental interests that
are aimed at promoting the common good.167 Although the
regulation does not actually achieve these intended goals as
shown earlier in this comment, it does not mean that the charac-
ter of the government action is without merit. There is rational
reasoning behind the regulations and this reasoning is linked to
the legislation. It is highly unlikely that a court would operate to
second guess the policy decision of Congress in this situation
because, despite the viewpoint expressed by this comment, ra-
tional minds can differ as to the correct amount of foreign in-
vestment that is optimal for U.S. airlines. In this situation,
Congress has made a policy decision and adjusted "the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." '68
Even though the final result of the current foreign investment
restrictions on U.S. air carriers may be disagreeable, this doesn't
mean that Congress's action was not appropriate or just, espe-
cially when there are national security issues at stake. Thus, be-
cause Congress's action in passing the foreign investment
restrictions in the U.S. air carrier industry was done to promote
the common good, this final factor also shows that the legisla-
tion does not amount to a regulatory taking.169
3. Summary of Penn Central Takings Analysis
After applying the Penn Central analysis, it becomes clear that
the legislation restricting foreign investment in U.S. air carriers
is not a regulatory taking. In fact, such a challenge to the legis-
lation probably fails on all three factors. The regulation leaves
the industry with a substantial amount of operations, challeng-
ers won't be able to claim an investment-backed expectation
that they would be able to take advantages of more foreign in-
vestment in airlines due to the extraordinary amount of time the
legislation has been in place, and, finally, the character of the
legislation was rationally passed for the purpose of the common
good.
However, just because the legislation does not amount to a
regulatory taking does not mean that the legislation is correct or
166 See Holtan-Murphy, supra note 8.





that it actually achieves its purported purpose. As discussed ear-
lier, the restrictions are actually counter-productive to their
stated goal and generally harm the industry. The loosening of
foreign investment restrictions on U.S. airlines should still be
pursued, but not as a regulatory taking. A lobbying effort to-
ward Congress is in order to acheive the desired legislation
change.
D. THE PATH AHEAD
After determining that U.S. airlines would greatly benefit
from a reduction in foreign investment restrictions, the next
question that must be answered is: what next? An initial reac-
tion would be to propose the complete elimination of all restric-
tions on foreign investment in U.S. air carriers. The policy and
reasoning discussed in this comment would certainly support
such a conclusion. In fact, most airlines support the complete
removal of all foreign investment restrictions.170
Unfortunately, the complete removal of investment restric-
tions is probably an unrealistic goal, considering that the Bush
Administration's proposal that foreign investment restrictions in
U.S. air carriers be scaled back to allow up to forty-nine percent
of an airline to be owned by foreigners was rejected by Congress
in 2003.171 A more realistic goal is to push for the approval of
the Bush Administration proposal allowing forty-nine percent
foreign ownership. 172 Once the negative consequences that op-
ponents to the proposal predict fail to materialize, and the air-
line industry begins to realize the benefits of the additional
capital available, it may be easier to lobby Congress for a full
removal of the restrictions.
II. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED EXCESS CAPACITY
Another aspect of the U.S. airline industry that is in desperate
need of adjustment is the overcapacity of domestic airlines
brought about by United States government subsidies. Most
Americans believe that subsidies in the airline industry are only
a European problem. 173 These Americans may be surprised at
170 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 4.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Andrew Stephen, America - Andrew Stephen Fears the Worst for US Airlines, NEW
STATESMAN, May 23, 2005, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/life/20050
5230014.
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the shocking amount of subsidies the U.S. government hands
out to air carriers. However, the real problem is not with the
subsidies themselves, but the devastating effects they are having
on the struggling U.S. airline industry.
A. OPERATING LOSSES FOLLOWED BY SUBSIDIES ARE A
VICIOUS CYCLE
In the minds of many people, giving an airline a little help (or
in the case of airlines, a lot of help) after it has gone through a
financially tough stretch may seem like a good idea. The prob-
lem with this reasoning is that the subsidies have the effect of
leaving the airline market as a whole in a worse situation than it
was before the individual air carriers began having difficulties
and required help. The problem that is created by a situation of
constant and massive federal sponsored bailouts of struggling
airlines is that because struggling airlines are not allowed to go
out of business, an intensely competitive market remains with
many air carriers fighting for the same customers, thereby driv-
ing down prices.17 4
This airline subsidy issue is no small problem. In fact, since
2001 the airline industry has been given at least $9.5 billion by
the federal government in the form of grants, loan guarantees,
and tax waivers. 17 5 Despite such massive government assistance,
from 2000 to 2004 airlines have lost more than $30 billion.'76
Things are not exactly looking up either. In the fourth quarter
of 2005, every major airline, except for low-cost carrier South-
west, reported a loss. 177 Even one of the few airlines that had
been historically profitable, JetBlue, lost money in the fourth
quarter of 2005.178
The reason that the airlines are continuously losing money
despite massive government subsidies is overcapacity. 179 Be-
cause every time a U.S. air carrier comes close to going out of
business the government bails them out, there are more airlines
174 Gessing, supra note 1.
175 Id. at 3.
176 Joel J. Smith, Airlines Pushed to Brink Over Low Fares, DETROIT NEWS, January
24, 2005, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/business/O501/24/aO1-
67893.htm.
177 James Bernstein, JetBlue Expects Quarterly Loss, NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 2006, at
A38.
178 Id.
179 Gessing, supra note 1, at 3.
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and airline capacity than the market demands. 8 ' According to
Wharton School of Business professor Elizabeth Bailey, "There
are too many carriers and too much capacity. This industry
hasn't been in equilibrium as long as I have been watching it."' 8 '
Even airline executives agree with this take on overcapacity. 18 2
In fact, the CEO of Southwest Airlines cited overcapacity as a
concern in a company earnings release." 3
In order to compete with so many other airlines, most air car-
riers add more routes, more planes, and cut prices.'8 4 This only
creates a cycle where, because of increased costs due to the in-
creased routes and decreased revenue due to slashed airfares,
airlines are forced to rely once again on government hand-
outs."8 5 As one airfare analyst aptly put it, "We're at a point
where the airlines have created a monster and it's like a runaway
train. Nobody is willing to step forward to stop it."186
In order to end the above described scenario, airline subsidies
must be stopped. Although it will be painful in the short-term
to allow a carrier to fail, in the long run the airline industry will
benefit from this approach. The remaining air carriers will be
stronger and in a significantly better position to take advantage
of the new opportunities left behind by the failed airline. 8 7
With fewer airlines in the market, air fares will gravitate back to
a natural market price absent overcapacity. Once this market
equilibrium is achieved, a self-sustaining and viable airline in-
dustry can be attained that does not need to be backed by
United States taxpayers.
B. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY
After eliminating subsidies in order to attain market equilib-
rium in air fares and reduce overcapacity, a change in how
judges approach airline bankruptcy will be necessary. Currently,
judges are too lenient while trying to help struggling airlines in
180 Wharton Strategic Management, Few Survivors Predicted: Why Most Airlines Are
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ues to be a challenge due to the glut of airline seats." Id.
184 JoelJ. Smith, supra note 176.
185 See id.
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bankruptcy. 188 At some point, it is necessary to allow a failing air
carrier to fail. While allowing an airline to fail to solve a prob-
lem may be counter-intuitive, it is the most sensible approach.
Allowing weaker companies to fail keeps markets in equilibrium.
One would think that in the United States, a supposed leader in
free markets, would readily embrace such a simple resolution. 189
One specific reform that is necessary to cure the overcapacity
problem is how airline bankruptcies are currently handled. 190
Currently, after a distressed airline files for bankruptcy they cut
costs, only to come out of bankruptcy and further challenge
competitors in an already overcrowded market. 1 ' This addi-
tional pressure from fresh-out of bankruptcy competitors puts
immense financial pressure on the other airlines and forces
them to cut fares to compete. 1 2 Predictably, another airline is
forced into bankruptcy, only to start the whole process over
again.' 9 ' Essentially, the U.S. airline industry is "bleeding itself
to death" through bankruptcy. 194
The problem with airline bankruptcies is that airlines are go-
ing bankrupt repeatedly, continuing the cycle.' 95 One such ex-
ample is United Airlines. 96 United Airlines is in Chapter 11
bankruptcy for the second time' 97 and is expected to emerge
sometime in 2006.1 The problem is that allowing United to go
into bankruptcy for the second time only makes the over-
capacity worse. 99 Despite the Chapter 11 process, the future
prospects for United do not look good.2 0 0 Low-cost carriers
such as Southwest are invading United's service areas and mak-
188 Wharton Strategic Management, supra note 180.
189 See Gessing, supra note 1, at 1.
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198 Ben Mutzabaugh, United Bankruptcy Exit Pushed Back to 2006, USA TODAY,
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ing a permanent recovery unlikely for United. 20' Thus, the most
likely scenario is that United emerges from bankruptcy, flooding
the market further with additional capacity, and then goes bank-
rupt again, perhaps taking another airline into bankruptcy with
it.
2 0 2
Judges currently either do not have the power, or choose not
exercise the power, to challenge airlines' reorganization deci-
sions.20 3 However, according to Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy
Code, a court should only confirm a reorganization plan if
"Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liq-
uidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan. 20 4
In other words, a judge should not confirm a plan unless it is
feasible. 20  Thus, judges should only allow an airline to emerge
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy if the airline has a real chance of
surviving upon exit.2 6 When deciding whether an airline has a
real chance of surviving, a court should look at the airline's busi-
ness model and whether the airline's re-entry to the market will
harm the industry, causing more bankruptcies. 2 7
Whether the problem can be solved by courts exercising their
power to reject Chapter 11 reorganization plans based on a lack
of feasibility, or if new legislation is necessary to stop these de-
structive reorganizations, the basic premise remains the same,
continual bankruptcy and reorganization is crippling the airline
industry.
C. MERGER PROBLEMS
One possible way to help alleviate the airline overcapacity
problem would be for some United States airlines to merge.
The problem is that U.S. regulations and policy prevent such
mergers from taking place.2°8 One such regulation, foreign in-
vestment restrictions, was discussed in Part I of this comment.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 Daniel P. Rollman, Comment, Flying Low: Chapter I I's Contribution to the Self-
Destructive Nature of Airline Industry Economics, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 408
(2004).
2 4 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006).
205 See id.
206 Wharton Strategic Management, supra note 180.
207 Rollman, supra note 203, at 411.
208 Gessing, supra note 1.
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Currently, U.S. airlines are simply not financially strong enough
to initiate mergers of any significant size.20 9 With access to for-
eign capital, consolidation could take place within the industry,
reducing overall capacity and putting the market back into equi-
librium.210 Once market equilibrium is achieved, air fares could
stabilize and airlines could become profitable.
Besides foreign investment restrictions, the federal govern-
ment sometimes blocks mergers that could achieve the desired
consolidation within the airline industry.211 One such example
was a proposed merger between United and US Airways.2 12 Un-
fortunately, in July of 2001, the United States Justice Depart-
ment threatened to block the merger for anti-competitive
reasons. 21  The problem is that allowing the merger to go
through would actually be beneficial for the industry by reduc-
ing the induced excess competition.21 4 Permitting some consoli-
dation activity to occur in the industry would allow newly
consolidated airlines to reduce overlapping capacity, and thus
reduce overall capacity.
Recent developments in the United States government's ap-
proach to mergers are promising. First, America West was al-
lowed to merge with US Airways. 21 5 Further, after United
emerges from Chapter 11, it is expected to engage in merger
talks with Continental. 216 The early indication is that the gov-
ernment will not act to block the merger, paving the way for
further consolidation within the industry.217 This new pro-con-
solidation stance taken by the Bush Administration should en-
courage mergers and hopefully promote market equilibrium.
By eliminating some of the competing airlines through mergers,
overcapacity can be reduced and the airline industry can move
closer to market equilibrium.21 8
29 Wharton Strategic Management, supra note 180.
210 See id.












Despite good intentions, United States lawmakers are hurting
the already struggling U.S. airline industry. Protectionist poli-
cies and overregulation are robbing U.S. air carriers of the bene-
fits of open markets that the majority of U.S. industries enjoy.
Denied such benefits, U.S. airlines as a whole have performed
terribly financially. 219 In spite of regulations aimed at protecting
U.S. airlines and massive government subsidies, U.S. air carriers
have lost roughly $30 billion from 2001 to 2005.220 Such stag-
gering losses indicate an obvious need for change in the regula-
tory framework of U.S. air carriers. In short, the United States
legislature needs to make another attempt at the deregulation
of the U.S. airline industry.
This comment has argued two main areas of United States
policy and legislation that must be reformed. The first is legisla-
tive restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. air carriers. Cur-
rently, the United States government mandates that foreign
parties may not own more than 25 percent of any U.S. air car-
rier,221 and also severely restricts the right of control that any
foreign investor has in a U.S. airline.222 The purpose behind
this legislation and regulatory framework is to protect the airline
industry, ensure domestic employment and labor rights, answer
national security concerns, and promote safety.223
However, as this comment has shown, removal of foreign in-
vestment restrictions will either not affect these concerns, or ac-
tually improve the situation. One such example is Congress's
intention of protecting American jobs in domestic airlines. Al-
lowing increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines would have
no effect on labor rights,224 and the increased access to capital
would help struggling airlines to continue avoiding layoffs and
funding pension plans.225 The other purposes behind the for-
eign investment restrictions are similarly debunked in this com-
ment. Thus, because the intentions of Congress are not being
achieved through this protectionist legislation, and U.S. airlines
219 SeeJoel J. Smith, Airlines Pushed to Brink Over Low Fares, DETROIT NEWS, Jan.
24, 2005, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/business/O501/24/aO1-
67893.htm.
220 Id.
22M 14 C.F.R. § 47.8(c) (2006).
222 Id.
223 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10.
2"4 Id. at 8.
225 Gessing, supra note 1, at 5.
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would greatly benefit from access to increased foreign capital,
foreign investment restrictions for U.S. airlines should be abol-
ished completely, or at least relaxed.
Although foreign investment regulations are unfair and hurt
the airline industry, air carriers do not have a legitimate claim
under a theory of regulatory taking. The regulation leaves the
industry with a substantial amount of operations, any challeng-
ers won't be able to claim an investment backed expectation
that they would be able to take advantages of more foreign in-
vestment in airlines due to the extraordinary amount of time the
legislation has been in place, and the character of the legislation
was rationally passed for the purpose of the common good. Al-
though an interesting idea, just because a regulatory takings the-
ory cannot be successfully argued in this instance does not mean
that the restrictions should be in place. It simply means that
efforts should be directed toward the legislature to repeal these
hurtful and unnecessary regulations against foreign investment
in U.S. airlines.
The other United States policy discussed in this comment that
needs to be re-evaluated is the current state of government
sponsored overcapacity. This overcapacity is caused by a combi-
nation of massive subsidies from the U.S. government, misuse of
the bankruptcy system, and the government's denial of poten-
tially beneficial mergers between air carriers. Since 2001, the
airline industry has been given at least $9.5 billion by the federal
government in the form of grants, loan guarantees, and tax waiv-
ers. 226 These subsidies encourage overcapacity in the airline
market by propping up airlines that would otherwise fail in the
open market.22 7 Thus, in order to compete amid a flood of gov-
ernment subsidized airlines, air carriers are forced to cut fare
228 cuprices. This cut in air fares pushes the market price down to
an unnaturally low level, negatively impacting revenues for all
airlines.2 29 Finally, the destructive process is completed when
the artificially low air fares force airlines to once again seek gov-
ernment subsidies, starting the process over once again.230
The second part of the government sponsored excess capacity
problem is the misuse of the bankruptcy protection regarding
failing airlines. As discussed above, after artificially low fares cre-
226 Id. at 3.
227 Wharton Strategic Management, supra note 180.





ate a business environment that is unsustainable for airlines, it is
inevitable that an airline will fail financially. 23 ' The problem
then becomes that after seeking bankruptcy protection, the pre-
viously failed airline will re-emerge only to start another round
of fare cutting, starting the whole process over again and caus-
ing yet another airline to seek bankruptcy. 2 2 In fact, airlines
sometimes go through this process and into bankruptcy multi-
ple times.233 The solution to this aspect of the government in-
duced excess capacity problem is simple, judges should not
allow failing airlines to emerge from bankruptcy protection un-
less the airline has a realistic chance of recovery. 2 4 By allowing
such airlines to actually fail and exit the marketplace, the mar-
ket will eventually reach an equilibrium point where airlines can
survive in the open market.
Finally, the last piece of the government induced overcapacity
problem is the tendency for the United States government to
block mergers in the airline industry that would reduce the
number of players in the market, and thus reduce capacity. Al-
though the government has a legitimate interest in blocking
mergers between companies that would create a monopolistic
environment 2nd therefore would hurt consumers, this is not
the case in the airline industry. Permitting some consolidation
activity to occur in the industry would allow newly consolidated
airlines to reduce overlapping capacity, and thus reduce overall
capacity. This reduced capacity would help to bring market
fares to a sustainable level. Fortunately, out of all the topics dis-
cussed in this comment, this area is the most promising. Recent
merger proposals in the industry have been approved,235 and
hopefully this is a sign of a new governmental stance toward air-
line mergers and overcapacity.
Overall, the level of regulation and protectionism in the
United States airline industry is shocking. The airline industry
should be able to benefit from an open market system exper-
ienced by the vast majority of other U.S. industries. Historically
abysmal financial performance by the industry as a whole and
the resulting massive government bailouts should be evidence
enough that a new approach to the industry is in order. In
short, deregulation of the airline industry deserves another shot.
231 See id.
232 See Wharton Strategic Management, supra note 180.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Doug Cameron, supra note 215.
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